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Eyewitnesses to crimes sometimes search for a culprit on social media before viewing
a police lineup, but it is not known whether this affects subsequent lineup identification
accuracy. The present online study was conducted to address this. Two hundred and
eighty-five participants viewed a mock crime video, and after a 15–20min delay either
(i) viewed a mock social media site including the culprit, (ii) viewed a mock social media
site including a lookalike, or (iii) completed a filler task. A week later, participants made an
identification from a photo lineup. It was predicted that searching for a culprit on social
media containing the lookalike (rather than the culprit) would reduce lineup identification
accuracy. There was a significant association between social media exposure and lineup
accuracy for the Target Present lineup (30% more of the participants who saw the
lookalike on social media failed to positively identify the culprit than participants in the
other conditions), but for the Target Absent lineup (which also included the lookalike) there
was no significant association with lineup identification accuracy. The results suggest
that if an eyewitness sees a lookalike (where they are expecting to see the culprit) when
conducting a self-directed search on social media, they are less likely to subsequently
identify the culprit in the formal ID procedure.
Keywords: digital detective, websleuth, eyewitness, lineup identification, police lineup, social media, post-event
information
“Websleuthing” describes amateur online crime investigations (e.g., Yardley et al., 2018) such
as “Facebook identifications” (Mack and Sampson, 2013) or “crowdsourcing” [Estellés-Arolas,
(2020)], which is the practice of engaging a crowd via digital technologies to achieve a common
goal. Websleuthing has become widespread on crime-solving can both contribute to, and hamper,
police investigations, as described below.
Through crowdsourcing, individual expertise and digital technologies can complement law
enforcement approaches [Estellés-Arolas, (2020)]. Social media users have helped to solve cases,
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found or verified evidentiary material1, extended community
policing2, and raised awareness of missing people3. Indeed,
following an attack in Philadelphia, police released video footage
and Twitter users were able to track down the perpetrators,
resulting in several positive identifications (Shaw, 2014).
There is additional evidence of positive outcomes from police
research. In a survey of police officers in the US (NCJRS,
2013), 80.4% responded that social media had helped to solve
crimes, while Kim et al. (2017) found that 89% of participants
from Law Enforcement agencies claimed to use social media
for disseminating information, and 58% had contacted social
media companies for evidence. Following interviews of police
investigators in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, Rønn et al.
(2020) concluded that social media should be part of investigative
police work, as it provides information that is not available in
police files.
However, Pantumsinchai (2018) argued that collective
intelligence during unfolding events can be problematic. For
instance, as an official police investigation was taking place
into the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, “Reddit” users
conducted their own investigation (Nhan et al., 2015) and named
innocent people who had not been involved (Lee, 2013; Nhan
et al., 2015; see also Lally, 2017). Reddit is a social media site
with posts known as “subreddits.” In 2012, a subreddit called
the Reddit Bureau of Investigation (RBI) was launched to solve
crimes (Myles et al., 2020). Similarly, after the Erawan Shrine
bombing in 2015, websleuthing resulted in doxing (seeking
and publishing of private or identifying information online)
and shaming, without resulting in a positive identification
(Pantumsinchai, 2018). Given the negative consequences of
websleuthing, Yardley et al. (2018) concluded that it may just be
a version of true crime “infotainment.”
Websleuthing also falls outside existing regulatory
frameworks, so social media identifications can create
complications at trial. This has happened in the US (e.g.,
State of Oregon v. Soza, 20084—police showed a witness a
MySpace image of Soza after they had been unable to identify
him in a lineup. This led to an appeal, but the conviction held.);
the UK (e.g., R v McCullough, 20115—lineup identification
evidence was deemed unreliable at appeal as it had come after
a self-directed Facebook identification, but the conviction held.
; R v Alexander and McGill, 20126—police were criticized at
appeal, after failing to disclose details of a self-directed Facebook
identification that preceded a formal lineup procedure, but the
convictions stood.); and in Australia (e.g., R v Benfield, 20157—
formal identification evidence that came after a Facebook search
was deemed inadmissible). The Police and Criminal Evidence
Act (PACE) guidelines have since been updated to include social
media evidence in England and Wales, although are aimed at
situations when, “. . . for the purpose of identifying and tracing
1Undisclosed (n.d.). https://undisclosed-podcast.com.
2Crime Stoppers (n.d.). https://crimestoppers-uk.org.
3Vanished Podcast (n.d.). http://www.thevanishedpodcast.com.
4State of Oregon v. Soza [2008] WL 4455613.
5R. v. McCullough [2011] EWCA Crim 1413.
6R v Alexander and McGill [2012] EWCA Crim 2768.
7R v Benfield [2015] SADC 150.
suspects, films and photographs of incidents or other images
are. . . shown to the public (which may include police officers
and police staff as well as members of the public) through the
national or local media or any social media networking site. . . ”
(Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 2017, Code D, Section
3, Part C, Paragraph 3.38). However, the effects of websleuthing
on criminal investigations have seldom been tested empirically
with regards to eyewitness identifications. This is surprising,
considering that the leading cause of wrongful convictions
in the US is related to eyewitness identifications, which are a
contributing factor in 75% of DNA exonerations (Innocence
Project, 2008). Comparable data is not available in the UK.
Injustices may also have been compounded by the rise in social
media, as searching for a suspect online (Wilson, 2013) could
potentially undermine police lineup safeguards.
Support for this suggestion comes from studies that have
explored the effects of other forms of post-event information
on eyewitness identification. Deffenbacher et al. (2006) meta-
analysis showed that exposure to mugshot images reduced
subsequent correct identifications. Similarly, Valentine et al.
(2012) found that street identifications can bias subsequent
identification decisions. This is supported by a field study in
which 84% of suspects identified in the street were identified in
a subsequent lineup (Davis et al., 2015). One interpretation of
the effect is a “commitment effect” (Godfrey and Clark, 2010;
Valentine et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2015), as witnesses who
identify an individual in one identification procedure are more
likely to select the same individual in a second identification
procedure, regardless of the accuracy of the first identification
(Blunt and McAllister, 2009). Another interpretation is that a
form of unconscious transference is at work (Deffenbacher et al.,
2006), where the face seen in the post-event information (e.g.,
a mugshot) makes the face of the perpetrator in the witness’s
memory inaccessible.
As well as mugshots and street identifications, research
has also explored the possible effect that constructing a
facial composite may have on subsequent lineup accuracy.
This has real-world importance because 27% of eyewitness
misidentifications reported by the Innocence Project (n.d.)
involved facial composite sketches. However, although some
studies have shown impaired identification performance
following composite construction (e.g., Wells et al., 2005), others
have found that identification accuracy improved (e.g., Davis
et al., 2014) with most research tending to find no effect (e.g.,
Pike G. E. et al., 2019; Pike G. et al., 2019). A meta-analysis of
this research revealed no significant negative effects of composite
construction (Tredoux et al., 2020), although it is possible that
exposure to a composite created by someone else may have a
negative effect if the suspect and composite image share the
same misleading feature, or either a positive or no effect if the
composite is a more accurate representation (Sporer et al., 2020).
The issues related to composite construction, street
identifications, and mugshot inspections are relevant to
social media investigations, as making a self-directed culprit
search online could also bias a subsequent lineup identification.
The study presented here was designed to address a particular
real-world issue. After witnessing a crime, some people use social
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media to seek the culprit. If the witness finds someone that they
think is the culprit on social media, they can go to the police with
this information. Under UK PACE guidelines the police must
still conduct a formal lineup, which will contain the suspect the
witness identified on social media (whether they are the culprit,
or an innocent lookalike). If a witness searches for the culprit on
social media, finds a plausible “lookalike” individual and reports
them to the police, the witness might then either “unconsciously
transfer” or “commit” to that face such that they would identify
this individual in a subsequent lineup. Of course, if the witness
finds an image of the culprit on social media, then the same
commitment effect would make them more likely to select that
face in a lineup, although the identification might be more based
on the more recent viewing of social media than their actual
memory of the crime. In addition, a witness who sees a lookalike
on social media but then sees the culprit in a lineup, might fail
to identify them if their memory had been contaminated by
the lookalike. To address this issue, the present study aimed to
investigate the effect of searching for a culprit on social media on
subsequent lineup identification accuracy. We predicted that if
an eyewitness sees a “lookalike” when conducting a social media
search, they are less likely to subsequently identify the culprit in
the formal ID procedure (Deffenbacher et al., 2006).
METHODS
Participants
We based our sample size on power considerations derived from
comparable research (Havard et al., under review) that indicates
a large effect size (Cramer’s V = 0.29, df = 4) (Cohen, 1988).
Given the inflated estimates of effect sizes in the literature (e.g.,
Open Science Collaboration, 2015), we aim to detect a more
conservative, medium-large effect. Two a-priori power analyses,
corresponding to the two conditions (TP and TA), were carried
out in G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007). The power analysis for the TP
condition estimated a required sample size of 142 participants
to detect a medium-large effect with a statistical power of 0.90,
and α = 0.05 (required Cramer’s V = 0.23, Cohen’s W = 0.33,
with df = 4) (Cohen, 1988). The power analysis for the TA
condition required a sample size of 132 (required Cramer’s V =
0.31, Cohen’sW = 0.31, with df = 2) (Cohen, 1988).
We sampled 285 participants with access to the internet (149
in the Target Present (TP) condition, and 136 in the Target Absent
(TA) condition) (see Table 1). The sample included 11 more
participants than required, as the two experimental sessions were
a week apart, so we could not be certain how many participants
that completed session 1 would complete session 2. They were
recruited via social media and university research participation
sites. Of these, 273 provided their age (M = 28.52; SD =
14.85), and 277 provided their gender: 231 identified as female;
44 as male; one as androgynous; and one as non-binary. Two
hundred and twenty-eight provided their ethnicity: 171 identified
as Caucasian; 34 as Asian (14 of which identified as Far East Asian
while four identified as South Asian); four as Mixed Race; two as
Black; two as Mediterranean; and one as Arab; one as Hispanic;
and one as Jewish.
Participants did not receive compensation for
their participation.
Design
The experiment employed a 3 × 2 between participant design.
The first independent variable was self-directed social media
search, with three levels: Culprit (social media containing the
culprit), Lookalike (social media containing a lookalike), Control
(no social media exposure). The second independent variable
was lineup type, with two levels: TP (culprit in the lineup)
and TA (lookalike in the lineup). The first dependent variable
was identification accuracy. In the TP lineups, participants
could make one of three responses: a correct identification,
a misidentification, or an incorrect rejection. In TA lineups,
participants could make one of two responses: a correct rejection,
or a misidentification. Data from the TP and TA lineups
were analyzed separately. The second dependent variable was
confidence, measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (very unsure) to
7 (very sure).
Materials
The experiment was built as a series of simple webpages (hosted
on the research group website), consisting of two sessions.
Session one presented an information page, a consent page,
a mock crime video, a 15–20min survey (exploring online
police/citizen communication), which acted as a filler task and
informed the development of measures for a police/citizen
app scoping study. Participants then either viewed a simulated
social media site (FriendFace) or took part in an alternative
activity [Ministry of Sharing, (n.d.)]. The latter tested whether
participants share too much information online.
Session two consisted of a photo lineup display consisting
of six simultaneously presented faces and two response boxes.
The lineup was created using PROMAT Video Identification
Parade Software. Photos showed the head and shoulders of each
individual against a green PROMAT background, photographed
in the same lighting conditions. The target present display
contained an image of the culprit, while the target absent display
contained an image of the lookalike. These were placed in the
same position in their display. As participants saw the lineup
online, on personal devices, we could not control the size or
color saturation of the images between participants. The method
described by Tredoux (1998) was used to calculate the effective
size of the target present lineup. Seventy-three participants made
a forced-choice selection from the lineup based on a verbal
description of the target and analysis showed an effective size (E)
of 4.05, with two of the foils being selected more frequently than
the target.
The mock crime video was created with a Caucasian male
actor as the target (the culprit). The video shows two women
seated at a bar while the culprit walks in and steals a handbag
hanging from a stool. The culprit then leaves the bar. The film
lasts∼30 s, and the culprit is visible frommultiple viewpoints and
close up during the film.
FriendFace was created to mimic a social network site and
was populated with content relating to the community event,
where the mock crime took place. The home page contained
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TABLE 1 | Experimental conditions, design, and number of participants.
FriendFace condition Culprit Culprit Lookalike Lookalike Control Control
Watched crime video Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Completed survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Viewed FriendFace Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
One week delay Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lineup type Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent
Number of participants 51 50 45 42 53 44
event photos, and names and thumbnail pictures of 14 people
who had indicated interest in attending (seven men and seven
women). Thumbnails consisted of a color close up of the
head and shoulders, taken in natural settings. By clicking on
the thumbnails, participants could view the “profiles” of each
potential attendee, including a larger version of the thumbnail,
and two additional images of them, where their face could be seen
from another viewpoint and in different lighting conditions (see
Supplementary Material). For the experimental manipulation,
two versions of a profile page were created from actors matched
according to age, build, and general appearance. One version
contained photos of the culprit but not the lookalike (culprit
condition), and the other contained photos of the lookalike but
not the culprit (lookalike condition). Photos were provided by
each individual on the FriendFace site (including the culprit and
the lookalike) from their personal social media accounts. The
lookalike was known to one of the authors and judged to be a
good match to the culprit by the authors. He provided photos
from his social media account.
Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in an online study. In
the first session, after participants viewed the mock crime and
completed the survey, they were assigned to one of three
conditions. There were two experimental conditions (culprit;
lookalike), and one control condition (see Table 1). Participants
in the two experimental conditions viewed the simulated social
media site, FriendFace. They were asked to imagine they had
attended the fictitious event where the crime had taken place
and were given the following instructions “You have just watched
a video of a crime that took place during a social event. This
event has a page on social media, which you can now view on
the computer. Browse through the social media site and see if the
person you saw stealing the handbag in the video appears on the
site. You can take as long as you want to do this.” Participants
were not asked whether or not they saw this person on the site
at this stage. In one condition, the profile of the culprit was
linked to the FriendFace site, and the participant could view
images of the culprit. In the other condition, the lookalike’s
profile was linked to the site, and the culprit was not present.
All participants saw the same culprit committing the crime, and
those who saw a lookalike all saw the same lookalike of this
culprit. Profiles of other potential “attendees” were also linked to
the site. Participants were free to explore the site for as long as
they wanted. Participants in the control condition did not view
the FriendFace site but took part in the alternative activity.
The second session took place 7–8 days later and was triggered
by an automated email. The delay was chosen to mimic a
minimum forensically realistic delay. Participants viewed a photo
lineup and were given the following instructions. “Last week you
watched a video of a mock crime and browsed a social media
page. Now you will see photos of people. Each photo will be
numbered. The man you saw in the crime video may or may not
be included. Please decide if you see the man from the crime
video. If you see him, please write down what number he is.
When they saw the lineup they were asked, “Is the person you
saw in the crime video also in the lineup?” Participants could
select “yes” or “no.” If they selected “yes” they were asked to
provide the number of the individual that they thought was the
culprit. All participants were then asked, “How sure do you feel
that your answer is right on a 1–7 scale?” They responded from 1
(very unsure) to 7 (very sure). Some saw a lineup that contained
the culprit (TP), while others saw a lineup that contained the
lookalike (TA). They were asked to provide their identification
decision and their confidence in that decision in the response
boxes provided. 24% did not return for the second session, so
their data were excluded from the final sample.
The experiment received approval from the Open University
Research Ethics Committee (Reference: HREC/3264/Elphick).
RESULTS
The Relationship Between Ethnicity and
Accuracy
As participants of different ethnicities took part and the images
were of white faces, we started by exploring whether the “other
race effect” (e.g., Sporer, 2001) was reflected in the accuracy of
the identification responses. We divided participants into those
who identified as Caucasian (n = 171), and those who did not
(n = 41) and found no difference in accuracy between the two
ethnic categories, X²(1)= 0.002, p = 0.96, V = 0.003. Therefore,
all participants were retained for subsequent analyses.
The Relationship Between Time Spent on
FriendFace and Accuracy
Participants in the experimental conditions (n = 232) spent
between 144 and 2312 s looking at FriendFace (M = 447.22,
SD = 240.33). Despite this large range, a logistic regression
revealed that there was no statistical significance between time
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FIGURE 1 | The proportion of identification responses (correct identifications,
misidentifications, and incorrect rejections) for the TP lineup conditions (culprit,
lookalike, and control).
spent on FriendFace and lineup identification accuracy, X²(1)
= 0.002, p = 0.97 (Inaccurate participants: M = 447.73; SD
= 266.43, Accurate participants: M = 446.30; SD = 184.78).
Longer search times were not associated with more accurate
identifications. Therefore, all participants were retained for the
following analyses.
Target Present Accuracy
In the TP condition, 34.9% of participants correctly identified
the target, 25.5%misidentified a distractor, and 39.6% incorrectly
rejected the faces. We explored relationships between social
media (culprit; lookalike; control) and identification response
(correct identification; misidentification; incorrect rejection). A
Chi Square analysis revealed a significant relationship, X²(4)
= 16.27, p = 0.01, V = 0.23 with a medium-large effect size.
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that this was driven by participants
in the lookalike condition, as only 11.11% of them correctly
identified the culprit (compared with 45.09% of participants
in the culprit condition and 45.28% in the control condition).
A considerably greater proportion of them made an incorrect
rejection (55.55%) than participants in the other conditions
(culprit condition = 31.37%; control condition = 33.96%).
A greater proportion of them also made a misidentification
(33.33%) than participants in the other conditions (culprit =
23.53%; control = 20.75%). Thus, in TP lineups, seeing a
lookalike on social media negatively affected lineup accuracy,
compared to either seeing the culprit, or not seeing the social
media page at all.
Target Absent Accuracy
In the TA condition, 59.6% correctly rejected the faces and
40.4% misidentified a distractor. We explored relationships
between social media condition (culprit; lookalike; control)
and identification response (correct rejection; misidentification).
However, we found no significant relationship, X²(2) = 0.58, p
= 0.75, V = 0.07 (see Figure 2). Thus, it made no significant
difference to lineup performance in TA lineups if participants
saw either the culprit or a lookalike on social media or did not
FIGURE 2 | The proportion of identification responses (correct rejections, and
misidentifications) for the target absent lineup conditions (culprit, lookalike, and
control).
FIGURE 3 | The proportion of lookalike and distractor misidentifications for the
target absent lineup conditions (culprit, lookalike, and control).
see social media at all. However, it is interesting to see from
Figure 2 that the proportion of correct and incorrect responses
in the culprit and control conditions are almost identical (62
and 61.36% were correct, respectively), while the pattern in the
lookalike condition is slightly different (54.76% were correct).
When examining the proportion of lookalike
misidentifications in each TA condition compared to
misidentifications of another distractor, it was revealed that
the lookalike was misidentified 40% of the time, and that
participants in any one condition were not significantly more or
less likely to misidentify the lookalike than in either of the other
two conditions, X²(2) = 3.22, p = 0.20, V = 0.24. Despite this
non-significant result, inspection of Figure 3 shows that only
about quarter (23.53%) of control participants misidentified the
lookalike, compared with 42.11% in the culprit condition and
about half (52.63%) in the lookalike condition.
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Overall Accuracy
Comparing conditions by analyzing TP and TA lineups
separately can be problematic as participants may adopt different
thresholds for selection. For example, they may be more
conservative in one condition meaning they are less likely to
select someone from the lineup. In light of this, accuracy was
also analyzed by computing the signal detection measures d’ and
C for each condition. For d’, which is a measure of sensitivity,
this yielded values of 0.15 in the control condition, 0.23 in
the culprit condition and −1.21 in the lookalike condition.
Criterion (C) provides a measure of bias. Mean criterion in
the control condition (−0.10) and the culprit condition (−0.11)
indicates fairly balanced responding, with only a small liberal
bias, while the positive criterion value in the lookalike condition
(0.36) indicates a conservative bias. This again suggests that the
difference in conditions is driven by poor performance in the
lookalike condition, where (unlike the other two conditions)
participants were more likely to make a misidentification than a
correct identification.
Confidence
The relationship between confidence and accuracy was examined
using point-biserial correlations for “choosers,” which revealed
a significant relationship, r (143) = 0.15, p < 0.05 (1-tailed),
and “non-choosers,” where the relationship was non-significant,
r (143)= 0.02, p= 0.84 (2-tailed). Noting the limitations of using
point-biserial correlations, confidence-accuracy characteristic
(CAC) analysis was conducted using the procedure described
by Mickes (2015) for estimator variables, whereby foil choices
from both TA and TP lineups are included. To balance N across
different confidence levels, the 1–7 scale was collapsed into low
(points 1–2), medium (points 3–4), and high (points 5–7).
Figure 4 shows that participants overall (and in the
control and culprit condition) used confidence (more or
less) appropriately, particularly with high confidence being
associated with a higher proportion of correct decisions. It was
not possible to calculate the proportion correct scores associated
with high confidence for the lookalike condition as no correct
IDs were made with a high level of confidence.
FIGURE 4 | CAC analysis overall and by condition.
DISCUSSION
The present study provides evidence that searching for a culprit
on social media can negatively affect identification accuracy in
TP lineups. Participants who saw a lookalike on social media
after witnessing a crime were less likely to recognize the culprit
in a subsequent lineup (compared with the other participants).
The results indicate that if an eyewitness seeks a culprit on
social media that contains a lookalike (between witnessing a
crime and doing a lineup where the culprit is present), they
are less likely to make a positive identification in the lineup.
The research also explored the effect in TA lineups, but no
significant relationship was found. The study indicated that the
effects of reinforcing and conflicting post-event information
were asymmetrical, as the negative effect on accuracy in TP
lineups of seeing a lookalike during a social media search
was not mirrored by a positive effect on accuracy of seeing
the culprit.
The present research is the first to investigate the effect of
self-directed social media searching on identification accuracy.
The results support previous eyewitness research showing
that mugshot exposure (Deffenbacher et al., 2006) and street
identifications (Valentine et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2015) can bias
subsequent identification accuracy, as seeing a lookalike on social
media in the present study resulted in a greater proportion of
errors in subsequent TP lineups. However, the finding that seeing
a lookalike on social media reduces correct identification by over
30% is dramatic compared to other studies (Memon et al., 2011).
Unlike some previous research (e.g., Davis et al., 2014), that has
found composite construction leads to a higher rate of correct
identifications compared to a control, our results were more
similar to the majority of composite research (Pike G. E. et al.,
2019; Pike G. et al., 2019; Tredoux et al., 2020) in finding no
significant improvement in correct identifications between the
Culprit and Control conditions.
Jenkins et al. (2011) study could offer some insight into
our results. It highlighted the challenge of “telling [unfamiliar]
people together” (taking into account differences seen in different
images of an individual’s face, due to lighting, viewpoint, etc.),
rather than the challenge of “telling [unfamiliar] people apart.”
These different challenges could shed light on the fact that social
media exposure only affected TP lineup accuracy in the present
research. In TA lineups, eyewitnesses only have to be able to “tell
people apart,” whereas in TP lineups, they also have to be able
to “tell people together” (they have to compare the culprit’s face
as they are viewing it with their memory of the culprit’s face)
when making their identification decision. Thus, not only do
eyewitnesses have to be good at both tasks, but the additional
task of “telling people together” could be the harder of the two
(Jenkins et al., 2011).
A limitation is that we only used one culprit and one
lookalike, so the effect could be attributed to a single item,
an issue that could be usefully addressed in future research by
using a larger sample of culprits and lookalikes and presenting
them in different lineup positions. Another limitation is that
we did not collect FriendFace identification data. This may
have helped us to determine where any effect had occurred
(e.g., on social media or during the lineup), and it might have
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influenced subsequent lineup response decisions (supporting
the notion of a “commitment effect,” e.g., Godfrey and Clark,
2010; Valentine et al., 2012). It would be worth exploring this
in future research by asking participants whether or not they
thought they saw the culprit on FriendFace when they were
still on the site. Also, the experiment emulated an eyewitness
seeing a crime and conducting a self-directed search immediately.
Despite the fact that the effect was medium-strong in the
present research, it would be worth investigating whether the
effect would be stronger if there was a delay between seeing
the crime and conducting the self-directed search, as Paterson
et al. (2009) found that post-event information had a greater
effect when misinformation was presented after a delay (2 weeks
rather than 20min). It would be particularly useful to test
this in TA lineups, as no significant effect was found in the
present study.
The results presented here have implications for police and
legal contexts, as they suggest that an eyewitness who searches
social media and sees someone resembling the perpetrator may
be more likely to make a misidentification than to correctly
identify the culprit. In one sense this seems to support a fairly
straightforward warning for criminal justice practitioners to be
wary of an eyewitness who conducts their own investigation via
social media. However, some care in this communication may
be needed, given the tendency of law enforcement personnel to
value positive lineup outcomes even if these occur at the expense
of misidentifications (Pike et al., 2021). This would suggest that
when disseminating the results to policing practitioners that
it may be important to highlight the low hit rate and high
incorrect rejection rate in the lookalike condition for target
present lineups.
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